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under the Palacio Government
During the past two decades decentral-
ization has become one of the most impor-
tant political developments worldwide.
Governments in industrialized and devel-
oping countries alike engage in the transfer
of resources and responsibilities to subna-
tional entities. The list of aspired benefits
from decentralization is long: improve-
ment of public service provision, increased
citizen participation and less corruption,
just to name a few. Overall, decentraliza-
tion reforms offer the promise of more
accountable and transparent government. 
In Latin America, many of the new
democracies placed decentralization on
the political agenda, among them the
Republic of Ecuador. When the country
returned to democratic rule in 1978, direct
elections for provincial and municipal
councils were reintroduced. Subnational
elections constituted an important step
towards political decentralization. The
transfer of resources (fiscal decentraliza-
tion) and of responsibilities (administra-
tive decentralization) to subnational levels
of government, however, has been the
subject of intense political struggle and
controversy since redemocratization.
The case of Ecuador highlights the
promises as well as the pitfalls of decen-
tralization. The massive uprising of civil
society in April 2005 against the illiberal
governing style of ex-president Lucio
Gutiérrez led to the ouster of the Gutiérrez
government and brought to power former
vice-president Alfredo Palacio. In an
attempt to regain legitimacy in the face of
massive popular discontent with the polit-
ical class Palacio promised to reinvigorate
the decentralization process and to engage
in a dialogue with citizens about political
reform. 
The ouster of president Gutiérrez – the
seventh president in the last ten years –
dramatically underlines the need for polit-
ical reform to revive the country’s weak
and discredited political institutions.
While the national level has been charac-
terized by instability, subnational govern-
ments have demonstrated a considerable
level of stability, with about one third of
all mayors reelected in the last municipal
elections. Overall, confidence in munici-
palities is higher than confidence in
national political institutions. Hence,
empowering those stable subnational units
appears to be a promising strategy in order
to improve gobernabilidad, which has
been a key concern in the domestic politi-
cal debate.
While the need for political reform and
the relative stability of subnational govern-
ments highlight the promise of decentral-
ization, the case of Ecuador also underlines
potential pitfalls. Decentralization is a polit-
ical process and reforms have to be agreed
upon at the national level. So far, political
actors have been unable to formulate any
kind of long-term national decentralization
strategy. The result has been a highly prob-
lematic decentralization process. Even the
initiative of the Palacio government to rein-
vigorate decentralization is unlikely to be
able to effectively address and overcome
the shortcomings that characterize decen-
tralization in Ecuador.
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The Ecuadorian Decentralization
Process
Although a considerable number of
measures have been adopted in the field of
decentralization –especially since the mid
1990s– the decentralization process in
Ecuador suffers from two main shortcom-
ings. Firstly, there is a disconnection
between the three dimensions of decen-
tralization: fiscal, administrative and
political. Political decentralization, i.e. the
popular election of subnational officials,
was introduced with redemocratization
and expanded with the 1998 constitution.
Decentralization on the administrative and
fiscal dimension has lagged considerably.
In Ecuador, two related phenomena can be
observed. On the one hand, resources are
transferred to subnational units –often
arbitrarily– without corresponding respon-
sibilities. On the other hand, responsibili-
ties for policy making are transferred
without adequate resources to carry out
these responsibilities. Both of these phe-
nomena are problematic as they may
increase opportunities for rent-seeking
and corruption and may adversely affect
the quality of public services. 
Secondly, decentralization is highly
uneven as subnational entities even at the
same level of government (i.e. provincial
or municipal) differ immensely regarding
the resources they receive and the policy
fields they are in charge of. For citizens,
this makes government less rather than
more transparent as it is often difficult to
identify governing bodies responsible for
policy-making.
The source of these two shortcomings
is the problematic legal framework of the
decentralization process. The main basis
of fiscal decentralization is the 15% Law
(Ley Especial de Distribución del 15% del
Gobierno Central para los Gobiernos
Seccionales), which was enacted in 1997.
The law establishes that 15 percent of the
central government’s income has to be
distributed to subnational governments
without an increase in the spending
responsibilities of provinces and munici-
palities. Subnational governments do not
have to use these resources for any specif-
ic purposes and can exercise substantial
discretion in utilizing the funds. The 1998
Constitution is the main basis of adminis-
trative decentralization, i.e. the transfer of
responsibilities. Article 226 of the Consti-
tution establishes the principle of optional
decentralization. It allows subnational
entities to demand responsibilities current-
ly in the hands of the central government
and determines that the central govern-
ment is obliged to transfer the responsibil-
ities along with corresponding resources.
This provision applies to all but six policy
sectors. Among these are defense and
national security, foreign policy, monetary
policy and issues of foreign debt. The only
ground on which the national government
can deny the transfer of responsibilities is
the lack of capacity to carry out the
demanded responsibility effectively. What
this means is that each responsibility
transfer is subject to an intense bargaining
process. The negotiations between the
central and subnational governments have
to determine –among other things–
whether the respective subnational gov-
ernment has the capacity to carry out the
responsibility and which amount of
resources is adequate for the effective ful-
fillment of the responsibility.  
In practice, this legal framework has
set disincentives for further administrative
decentralization. Currently, municipal and
provincial governments receive funds that
are not tied to spending responsibilities.
As the central government has been under
considerable financial pressure during the
past years, it has often argued that subna-
tional governments should use the funds
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they receive on the basis of the 15% Law
to cover the cost of additional administra-
tive responsibilities. Under conditions of
uncertainty about financial resources
demanding additional administrative
responsibilities has not been an attractive
strategy for most subnational govern-
ments. The incentive structure that results
from the combination of the 15% Law and
the principle of optional decentralization
established by the Constitution has con-
tributed to a situation in which about 40
percent of municipalities have failed to
demand administrative responsibilities.
Particularly resource-intense policy sec-
tors, such as health and education, remain
highly centralized. Responsibilities in
‘soft’ sectors, such as tourism and envi-
ronmental policy, are generally easier to
decentralize and almost all demanded
responsibilities fall into these two sectors.
The 15% Law and Article 226 of the
1998 Constitution can be seen either as
advances or regresses. On the one hand,
they opened the door for more decentral-
ization and hence clearly constituted
important steps in the process. On the
other hand, they were not integrated into a
comprehensive decentralization frame-
work. Due to the lack of a comprehensive
strategy, positive effects which decentral-
ization aims to provide were jeopardized.
Decentralization therefore fails to con-
tribute to the provision of public goods
and the increase of political transparency.
Prospects of Decentralization 
under the Palacio Government
Decentralization is a political process.
The transfer of financial resources and
responsibilities brings with it the redistrib-
ution of power in the political system.
Since the cornerstone of decentralization is
the transfer of resources and responsibili-
ties from the national to the subnational
level, the central government is a key actor
in the process. Essentially, the national
level has to agree to give up resources. 
Against this background, it might
seem promising that the Palacio govern-
ment has put decentralization back on the
political agenda. With backing from the
presidential palace, one might assume,
decentralization is likely to make consid-
erable headway in the coming months.
Despite the new decentralization initiative
of the Palacio government, however, the
decentralization process is unlikely to pick
up speed in the near future.
The problematic decentralization
process is just one aspect of a broader
political and institutional crisis. The dis-
content with the political class led to the
mobilization of civil society and the so-
called rebelión of the forajidos in April
2005. The demonstrators, primarily mem-
bers of the middle classes of Quito, were
an heterogeneous group. While they were
united by their rejection of the illiberal
governing style of president Gutierrez,
they did not have a joint project for
reform. The rebellion of the forajidos sup-
plied little in terms of a concrete mandate
for change beyond dissatisfaction with the
current political class. 
This dissatisfaction stems from the
continuing inability of the political class
to address the country’s problems. The
highly fragmented party system has been
unable to effectively channel citizens’
demands and to provide a link between
citizens and the state. Despite mounting
pressure and the apparent need for politi-
cal and economic reforms, parties in con-
gress have been unable to agree on much
needed long-term reform strategies. The
shortcomings of the decentralization
process are the result of a mode of politi-
cal representation that has advanced short-
term particularistic projects.
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In this political landscape Palacio is
unlikely to find the allies he needs to put
the decentralization process back on track.
The Palacio government is widely per-
ceived as a transition government. It was
brought to power as a result of the ouster
of Gutiérrez and does not have strong
political support, neither among parties in
parliament nor among citizens. Elections
are scheduled for the last trimester of
2006. Until then decentralization is
unlikely to make headway.
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Maja Neff
Approaches to a Hemispheric
America in The Rag Doll
Plagues.
An Interview with Chicano
Author Alejandro Morales.
Maja Neff (MN): Alejandro, you
have come to be known as a Chicano
writer,  a writer publishing bilingual books
in Spanish and English, as someone dis-
cussing concepts of transnationalism and
heterotopia. In an interview, you once
mentioned that the initial thought to devel-
op the plot of your novel The Rag Doll
Plagues was a story on Chicanos being
‘deported’ to a hospital against their will.
Remembering this event as a motivator, I
wonder what made you create the border-
less zone of LAMEX in the third part of
the book – was there also an event or a sit-
uation inspiring you? 
Alejandro Morales (AM): In the first
part of the book taking place in Mexico
City around 1788, you have Europe
migrating to the New World. Once they
established their economy, the Spanish
were beginning to push North and South,
migrating to different parts of the conti-
nent. In the second part of the book, set in
Orange County, California, in 1979, you
have the issues of Mexicanos coming
across the border. So there is migration,
racism, different cultural, ethnic, econom-
ic groups are all working and living
together in that area. Looking at these
developments, I then decided to go for-
ward in time. What’s going to happen in
the future? Will we have to deal with the
same issues? Will there still be a border?
That is how I started writing the third part.
I tried to develop a vision of what the area
between Los Angeles all the way to Mexi-
co City is going to look like a hundred
years from 1979. In that third part, the
LAMEX part of 2079, you don’t have a
border. There exists a triple alliance
brought about not by economic nor politi-
cal nor military reasons – the triple
alliance between Canada, the United
States, and Mexico is brought about
because of ecological reasons. So those
three countries all organize themselves to
try to deal with this, to avoid great ecolog-
ical disasters. But you cannot control what
they have already done, the damage to the
ocean, the dumping of thousands and
Foro de debate 173
Ib
er
oa
m
er
ic
an
a,
 V
I,
 2
2 
(2
00
6)
Rev22-02  5/6/06  10:11  Página 173
